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18 Consumer countries and blocs, including the UK and the EU, are defining legal measures to tackle 
19 deforestation linked to commodity imports, potentially requiring imported goods to comply with the 
20 relevant producer countries’ land-use laws. Nonetheless, this measure is insufficient to address 
21 global deforestation. Using Brazil’s example of a key exporter of forest-risk commodities, here we 
22 show that it has ~3.25 Mha of natural habitat (storing ~152.8 million tons of potential CO2 
23 emissions) at a high risk of legal deforestation until 2025. Additionally, the country’s legal 
24 framework is going through modifications to legalize agricultural production in illegally deforested 
25 areas. What was illegal may become legal shortly. Hence, a legality criterion adopted by consumer 
26 countries is insufficient to protect forests and other ecosystems and may worsen deforestation and 












































































31 1. The trade of forest-risk commodities
32 The way we use the land to produce, trade, and consume food is directly connected to social-
33 environmental issues like deforestation, biodiversity loss, human rights violations, climate change, 
34 and pandemics (Laroche et al 2020, Brancalion et al 2020, Curtis et al 2018). The production of 
35 agricultural commodities is a key driver of deforestation across the globe (Curtis et al 2018). 
36 However, deforestation embedded in global supply chains is especially acute in the trade routes 
37 between commodity-producing countries in the Global South and commodity-importing countries in 
38 the Global North. Recognizing their roles as importers and consumer countries, the United Kingdom 
39 and the European Union are considering policy measures to address imported deforestation (Bager et 
40 al 2021). In the context of distant connections in food supply chains (Laroche et al 2020), it is crucial 
41 to account for GHG emissions, biodiversity loss, and traditional communities’ rights embedded in 
42 food imports, taking appropriate mitigation measures.
43 Over the last decade, a wave of voluntary commitments from the private sector and nations (e.g., 
44 the Consumer Goods Forum or via the Amsterdam Declarations Partnership) have fallen short in 
45 making progress towards deforestation-free supply chains (Garrett et al 2019). Hence, at present, 
46 there is growing momentum for bolder actions from both government and private companies. Many 
47 discussions are in place on what policies could most efficiently halt the environmental degradation 
48 driven by agricultural imports (Bager et al 2021). Part of this debate favors mandatory due diligence 
49 by importing countries to verify compliance with legal criteria from exporting countries (Bager et al 
50 2021, Kehoe et al 2020). It is essential to highlight that any legislation to tackle deforestation via a 
51 legality-based approach is dependent on the efficacy of local governments and legislation and, 
52 ultimately, its alignment with downstream deforestation-free objectives.
53 Considering Brazil as an example of a key agricultural exporter; the country produced around 
54 118 million tons of soybeans in 2018 alone, representing 36% of global soy production (FAO 2021). 







































































55 57% of Brazil’s production in 2018 was exported to China and 11% to Europe, including the UK 
56 (Trase 2021). The soy-deforestation risk of this Brazilian soy, which includes deforestation and 
57 native vegetation loss in the previous five years that became soy up to 2018, was about 61.4 thousand 
58 hectares, emitting slightly over 10 million tons of CO2 (Trase 2021). About 6.3 thousand hectares of 
59 this native vegetation loss (~10%) and ~1.1 million tons of emitted CO2 (~11%) belong to the EU, 
60 including the UK. These volumes refer only to 2018 soybean production, with impacts even higher in 
61 previous years (Trase 2021).
62 Despite global climate and biodiversity crises, Brazil’s current environmental legislation 
63 authorizes significant amounts of vegetation loss (Rajão et al 2020). This destruction is not necessary 
64 from a land-resource standpoint. Brazil has sufficient suitable lands for expanding production 
65 without clearing additional hectares of native vegetation (Strassburg et al 2014). Moreover, 
66 deforestation jeopardizes overall agricultural production and income due to disruptions in local 
67 rainfall patterns driven by deforestation (Leite-Filho et al 2021). Not even the existing legal 
68 requirements are adequately enforced. Roughly 20% of Brazil’s soy and at least 17% of beef exports 
69 to the EU, produced on the Amazon and Cerrado biomes, may be contaminated by illegal 
70 deforestation (Rajão et al 2020). Previous studies have shown the limits of Brazil’s legislation to 
71 tackle illegal deforestation (Azevedo et al 2017), and the actual and potential increases in 
72 deforestation stemming from bailouts and revisions in the Forest Code (Albuquerque Sant’Anna and 
73 Costa 2021, Freitas et al 2018b, Sparovek et al 2012).
74 2. Natural habitat at high risk of legal deforestation
75 Here we build upon and go beyond Rajao et al.’s (2020) study. We estimate the potential legal 
76 deforestation and carbon emissions in Brazil that may take place shortly (until 2025). For this, we 
77 combine several spatially explicit databases and a spatial model that estimates the probability that 








































































78 native vegetation will remain until 2025 in the face of several drivers of land use change (See 
79 Methods).
80 We identify 1,114,693 rural establishments holding ~69.2 million hectares of unprotected native 
81 vegetation (i.e., that can be legally deforested), storing ~5.8 billion tons of CO2 (Tables 1 and S1). 
82 Out of these, ~3.25 million hectares storing ~152.8 million tons of CO2 are at high risk of 
83 deforestation and native vegetation conversion until 2025. Another ~26.8 Mha storing 1.1 billion 
84 tons of CO2 are at medium risk (Tables 1, S1, Figures 1, S1, and S2). This is a plausible extent of 
85 short-term future deforestation risk. In 2020 alone, Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado biomes together 
86 lost 1.8 Mha (PRODES-INPE 2021), with about 70% of this occurring in private lands according to 
87 our own estimates based on the properties map of (Freitas et al 2018a). 
88 Table 1 – Native vegetation and potential carbon dioxide stocks that can be legally cleared and emitted in Brazil until 
89 2025. 






1 High Risk 104,145 3,251,961 152,816,882
2 Medium Risk 464,162 26,777,911 1,107,194,477
3 Low Risk 319,808 29,037,483 3,796,246,697
4 No Risk 226,578 10,186,942 782,194,659
Total 1,114,693 69,254,298 5,838,452,715
90








































































91 Figure 1 – Maps showing the largest CO2 stocks (in tonnes) and native vegetation areas (in ha) at high risk of legal 
92 conversion in Brazil until 2025. 
93 All areas coloured here are municipalities holding areas at high risk of legal conversion. The gradient from yellow to red 
94 indicates hectares of potential vegetation loss and tonnes of potential CO2 emissions grouped by municipalities. Pantanal 
95 and Pampa biomes appear with the highest risk because these biomes are (i) relatively less protected by public protected 
96 areas, such as conservation parks and indigenous lands, (ii) have relatively more private properties than the Amazon, for 
97 example, (iii) the Forest Code’s mandate for Legal Reserves is smaller in these biomes, setting only 20% of the 
98 properties’ area aside for conservation. Therefore, 80% of properties’ areas are open for legal deforestation. Finally, these 
99 areas are closer to agriculturally consolidated regions, near roads and commodity infrastructure and have favourable 
100 edaphoclimatic conditions for agricultural commodities cultivation, as considered by Fendrich et al (2020)’s model. 
101








































































102 3. The legal basis of deforestation in Brazil
103 The legislative framework built to protect native vegetation in Brazil comprises two main 
104 instruments: protected areas in public lands and mandatory conservation in private properties. 
105 Protected areas include conservation units – such as national parks and forests – and traditional 
106 peoples lands – such as indigenous communities. On the other hand, mandatory protection in private 
107 property is mainly regulated by the Forest Code, introduced in 1934 and most recently revised in 
108 2012. The Brazilian Forest Code, unlike most European forest laws, was designed within the 
109 paradigm of an open agricultural frontier, granting rural owners the subjective right to convert forest 
110 land into agricultural areas as long as certain limits are respected (Rajao et al 2021, de Toledo et al 
111 2017). These limits are legally defined as Permanent Preservation Areas (natural vegetation in 
112 riverbanks, for instance, PPAs) and Legal Reserve (LR), a portion of a given property set aside for 
113 conservation or sustainable management (Rajão et al 2020, Sparovek et al 2012).
114 In the forestlands of the Amazon biome, as a general rule, 80% of any medium-to-large private 
115 property is overall considered Legal Reserve (LR). However, this general rule has exceptions since 
116 special conditions allow Amazon states and municipalities to reduce this LR area to 50% (Freitas et 
117 al 2018b), and medium to large farmers who cleared up to 50% of their forestlands prior to 2001, 
118 when the Legal Reserve was effectively increased from 50 to 80% in the Amazon forestlands, are 
119 allowed to have only 50% LRs. Small holders who cleared any amount of LR up to July 2008 have 
120 been granted amnesty, therefore not needing to restore these parts (Stickler et al 2013). This level of 
121 protection is often used as an example of ambitious legislation, but it also means that 20-50% of 
122 these medium-to-large properties can be lawfully deforested. Considering that properties in the 
123 Amazon can be as large as 20-thousand hectares, the areas open for legal deforestation according to 
124 Brazilian law are far from insignificant. Additionally, elsewhere in Brazil, the Legal Reserve areas 
125 range from 20% to 35% in equally important biomes such as the Cerrado savanna and the Pantanal 
126 wetlands. The Atlantic Forest is an exception because the Mata Atlântica protection law forbids any 







































































127 additional clearing. Therefore any deforestation within this biome is undeniably illegal. These 
128 biomes are critical carbon sinks. Their conservation is crucial for tackling climate change and the 
129 CO2 emissions driven by land use change (Rajão et al 2020). 
130 All in all, the 2012 version of the Forest Code defines at least ~101 Mha of Brazil’s biomes as 
131 areas open for legal deforestation (Freitas et al 2018a). This area is about four times the territory of 
132 the United Kingdom. The clear-cut of such regions would mean extra emissions of at least 12.48 
133 billion tons of CO2  – all of which potentially authorized by the current Brazilian legislation (Freitas 
134 et al 2018a). This amount is almost 34 times the UK’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
135 2018 alone (UCS 2020). In alignment with our short-term modelled estimates (See Methods), this 
136 area is what we consider as the total amount of possible legal deforestation. Whilst not all of this is 
137 likely to be cleared in the near term due to political, biophysical, and infrastructural constraints for 
138 deforestation, some areas in Brazil are likely to be at particularly high risk (Figure 1). 
139 4. Changing legislation over time
140 As stated above, Brazil’s legislation is permissive enough to allow for a substantial amount of 
141 legal CO2 emissions via land use change. Yet, the legal framework to protect native vegetation has 
142 been changing in the recent years to allow more legal deforestation and legalize economic activities 
143 carried out in former forests and natural habitat that was illegally cleared. The 2012 Forest Code is a 
144 stark example of this situation (Sparovek et al 2012). From the 1990s, Brazilian environmental 
145 agencies ensured that law enforcement was more stringent than before, and thousands of non-
146 compliant rural producers were fined. This generated political pressure to revise the law, passed in 
147 2012, with several amnesties for illegal deforestation carried out before 2008 (Albuquerque 
148 Sant’Anna and Costa 2021), thus effectively legalizing previously illegal deforestation. With the 
149 changes in 2012 alone, about 41 Mha of deforested and converted lands that should otherwise have 
150 been restored to native habitat were granted amnesty (Freitas et al 2017). Another ~1 Mha is 








































































151 estimated to have been deforested between 2012 and 2017 due to the incentives provided by the 
152 revisions to law (Albuquerque Sant’Anna and Costa 2021). 
153 The Forest Code is not an isolated case. Several bills in Parliament are on the verge of being 
154 approved that are likely to bring more amnesties and open additional space for legal deforestation 
155 (See the SI, List of Brazilian Congress Bills). These bills are part of an overarching movement by the 
156 current Bolsonaro administration to re-shape the socio-environmental legal framework in Brazil, 
157 incentivizing further legal destruction of natural habitat and carbon emissions and the legalization of 
158 agricultural activities that are currently unlawful. 
159 This social-environmental legal laxation movement by the current administration, however, does 
160 not sit in isolation. Within  local political constituencies ,pro-development and anti-environmental 
161 groups are important supporters of the current government and were determinant forces in the 
162 election of Bolsonaro for presidency in 2018 (Raftopoulos and Morley 2020, Russo Lopes and 
163 Bastos Lima 2020). They are also influential in elections at local levels, mainly in municipalities and 
164 states (Rodrigues-Filho et al 2015, Pailler 2018), and are likely to substantially influence the next 
165 presidential elections in 2022.
166 5. Ways Forward
167 To effectively implement a legality-based sustainability policy, legal deforestation activity should 
168 be monitored by producer-country authorities and by the supply chain itself. In ideal circumstances,  
169 Brazilian-based tier-1 companies (i.e. sourcing directly from farmers) would be able to conduct basic 
170 verification of their suppliers (i.e. farmers), as they do in arrangements such as the Amazon Soy 
171 Moratorium (Austin et al 2021, Heilmayr et al 2020),  cattle agreements (Gibbs et al 2015), or the 
172 High Carbon Stock Approach (Austin et al 2021). However, this verification capacity would not be 
173 directly possible for tier-2 or tier-3 companies (e.g. importers, processors and retailers), obliged to 
174 meet the incoming United Kingdom’s due diligence legislation to place materials on the UK market, 








































































175 since they do not purchase directly from farmers, but from tier-1 companies. Another example of 
176 basic verification, in Brazil, is the Federal Environmental Enforcement Agency (IBAMA)’s list of 
177 embargoed areas. This list indicates areas that have been illegally cleared. When detected, these areas 
178 are embargoed to promote the restoration or regeneration of native vegetation. Nothing can be 
179 produced or traded from these areas. Therefore, a basic verification step to be carried out by 
180 companies is checking whether their supplying farmers are on that list. 
181 Second, companies can undertake supply chain engagement with upstream suppliers (Austin et al 
182 2021),  and request the documentation attesting the legality of production. In Brazil’s example, a 
183 farmer can only conduct deforestation if they hold an Authorization for Native Vegetation 
184 Suppression (ASV, in Brazilian Portuguese acronym), which is issued by state authorities. Therefore, 
185 downstream companies might detect deforestation on a supplying-farm by remote sensing and 
186 request the presentation of this permit as proof of legality. Importantly, the existence of this permit 
187 system implies that achieving zero-illegal deforestation or native vegetation conversion relies 
188 substantially on the discretion of the domestic legislation of producer-countries. The robustness of 
189 the domestic legislation is therefore worthy of additional attention”. 
190 In the case of Brazil, for example, to be considered legal, any land use change from native 
191 vegetation to agricultural cover in Brazil must be subject to approval by the State Environmental 
192 Department before it takes place. The State Environmental Department must assess cases and issue 
193 land clearing permits if the requests comply with all legal requirements. Authorizations must identify 
194 the geospatial location of the clearance. Nevertheless, most states in Brazil lack any tracking system 
195 for these authorizations, which means there is effectively no monitoring of whether the authorized 
196 deforestation is being carried out lawfully. Currently, Brazilian agencies lack the technical capacity 
197 and political willingness to monitor, verify, enforce and report land use regulation.







































































198 Without such local information (i.e., the ASVs), and in the context of the global supply chains in 
199 which soy is embedded, it is virtually impossible to attest if deforestation has been carried out legally 
200 or not (Valdiones et al 2021). Companies point out technical difficulties in monitoring and verifying 
201 legal deforestation to challenge regulation and enforcement by consumer countries (Lambin et al 
202 2020). An ideal scenario would be one where buyers could request the legal permits of clearings and 
203 production operations from their upstream suppliers (i.e., farmers). However, this is complicated by 
204 technical issues related to Brazilian authorities’ incapacity or unwillingness to monitor, verify, 
205 enforce, and report legal compliance. 
206 There are several methods to trace and verify gross (i.e. rather than just legal) zero-deforestation 
207 and natural habitat conversion in export supply chains at the jurisdictional level of production 
208 (Lathuillière et al 2021, Green et al 2019, Escobar et al 2020, Austin et al 2021). Platforms such as 
209 Trase (Trase 2021) and Mapbiomas (Mapbiomas 2021) are examples of publicly available supply 
210 chain and land use data that companies can use for risk assessments. These tools do not yet show 
211 deforestation at the individual farm-level in the case of Brazil. This level of detail would, for 
212 example, require integration with official government data, such as with the Rural-Environmental 
213 Registry (CAR, in the Brazilian-Portuguese acronym), and the ASV state spatial datasets but these 
214 datasets are still pending validation and not publicly available in all states (Valdiones et al 2021). 
215 Despite the limitations of publicly available data that links supply chain activities to gross clearance, 
216 it is arguably the case that – due to concerns about local monitoring and enforcement necessarily to 
217 demonstrate legality - downstream companies can assess risk exposure to gross deforestation at least 
218 as easily as to illegal deforestation.
219 Ultimately, companies can – and do – have mechanisms to audit and verify whether their supply 
220 chains are deforestation-free via supplier engagement processes, such as voluntary certification 
221 schemes such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy (RTRS) and the Forest Stewardship Council 
222 (FSC). However, a missing link to ensure a level playing field and promote industry-wide action is 






































































223 mandatory regulation that applies to all companies for all forest-risk commodities, with requirements  
224 for precise cut-off dates, past, present, or future, to mark when no conversion will be allowed in 
225 supply chains (Garrett et al 2019). These certification tools can, therefore, be important learning and 
226 information experiences to construct new mandatory systems.
227 Since companies and supply chain actors have been failing to define commitments and cut-off 
228 dates voluntarily (Garrett et al 2019), clear and stringent mandatory regulation demanding zero gross 
229 deforestation and natural habitat conversion by consumer-country authorities appears to be an 
230 effective measure. While the introduction of downstream legislation covering all forms of 
231 deforestation may appear politically infeasible in the short term (Bager et al 2021),  it should not be 
232 dismissed as an ultimate goal. Nor should other potential policy mechanisms which have the 
233 potential to encompass broader protections be de-prioritized.
234 In sum, in addition to being insufficient to prevent deforestation activity in all forms, regulation 
235 based solely on the criterion of legality carries the risk that it may be detrimental to the protection of 
236 forests. In countries where legislation can be easily modified, as is demonstrably the case for Brazil, 
237 increased demand for products with legal origins can increase pressure for legislative changes that 
238 aim to legalize agricultural activities located in illegally deforested areas. These legislative changes, 
239 in turn, also pave the way for more legal deforestation. Therefore, while welcoming the steps made 
240 by governments to introduce regulation to respond to the global threat of deforestation, we urge 
241 consumer-nation policymakers to consider zero-gross deforestation and zero native vegetation 
242 conversion criteria in their initiatives to address imported deforestation, GHG emissions, and 
243 biodiversity loss, considering that this is technically viable and potentially effective despite the short-
244 term political hurdles that would need to be overcome to implement these advanced measures. 
245 6. Methods and Data







































































246 First, we use a property-level boundaries spatial dataset, which includes the amounts of Legal 
247 Reserves (LR), Permanent Preservation Areas (PPAs), and the surplus of LRs (i.e., that can be 
248 legally cleared) (Freitas et al 2018a). Second, we use an aboveground carbon density map at 50m 
249 pixel resolution for Brazil (Englund et al 2017). Third, we use spatial projections of unprotected 
250 native vegetation in private lands, considering rural establishments that can conduct legal clearings 
251 (Freitas et al 2018a). Fourth, we employ a spatially-explicit modelling approach that estimates the 
252 probability of the existence of native vegetation until 2025 (Fendrich et al 2020). This model 
253 considers topography, soil properties, climate data, distance to transportation corridors, and legally 
254 protected areas, including indigenous lands. This unprecedented combination of spatial datasets 
255 allows us to estimate the potential future legal deforestation with different levels of risk. For  the 
256 purpose of alignment with climate policy, we use the 44/12 conversion factor to estimate the 
257 potential carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions based on the total carbon stocks in the areas at risk of legal 
258 deforestation (Federici et al 2015). Therefore, we report the results directly in potential CO2 
259 emissions.
260 We adopt a conservative approach, excluding from this analysis the areas that Freitas et al. 
261 (2018a) projected as potential private properties to fill spatial gaps in the Brazilian territory. We only 
262 consider the rural establishments officially registered and identified at Brazilian land databases. 
263 Therefore, while Freitas et al. (2018a) estimated ~101 Mha of unprotected native vegetation within 
264 private lands, we only considered ~69.2 Mha. We use Fendrich et al.'s (2020)(Fendrich et al 2020) 
265 land cover model to classify these unprotected areas according to their risk of conversion. 
266 The land tenure database presented in Freitas et al. (2018) (Freitas et al 2018a) and updated by 
267 Freitas et al. (2018) (Freitas et al 2018b) was used as starting point for the analysis presented here. 
268 This database comprises public and private properties in Brazil such as Indigenous Lands, 
269 Conservation Units, Quilombola Territories, and private rural properties from the Rural 
270 Environmental Registry (Portuguese acronym CAR) and the georeferenced properties of the National 







































































271 Agrarian Reform Institute (Portuguese acronym SIGEF). The database also includes information on 
272 the compliance of these rural properties with the Brazilian Forest Code. It has information related to 
273 the area of native vegetation and the amount of aboveground carbon stock within each rural property 
274 (Freitas et al 2018a, Englund et al 2017). With the existent variables, it is also possible to identify the 
275 part of the native vegetation (or its carbon stocks) that is both legally protected or has the potential to 
276 be legally deforested (the latter called hereafter as unprotected native vegetation or unprotected 
277 carbon stocks). 
278 Fendrich et al. (2020) (Fendrich et al 2020) presented maps of the probability of the existence of 
279 native vegetation in a given pixel for the years 2017 and 2025. The probabilities are calculated based 
280 on a spatially explicit regression model that explores the relation of land cover maps of the 
281 Mapbiomas project (2019)(Mapbiomas 2021) and spatial variables (drivers of land cover change), 
282 such as topography, soil properties, climate data, distance to transportation corridors and legally 
283 protected areas, including indigenous lands. The land cover maps were reclassified to four classes in 
284 the model, namely, native vegetation, pasture, agriculture, and other uses. The existence of these four 
285 land cover classes was analyzed for every pixel in the entire period (from 1985 to 2017). The model 
286 captured the relation of the land cover classes and the spatial variables. Based on alternative future 
287 climate and policy scenarios (S1 - aggressive, S2 - business as usual, and S3 - conservative 
288 scenarios), Fendrich et al. (Fendrich et al 2020) estimated the probability of the existence of native 
289 vegetation, agriculture, and pasture in Brazil for the year 2025. 
290 The Fendrich et al. (2020)’s scenarios are based on the following. The S1 scenario, aggressive, 
291 considers no mitigation policy and additional environmental protection is adopted in Brazil. 
292 Furthermore, transport and energy national expansion plans are fully implemented, the population 
293 and the economy grows untapped according to national projections. The S2, business as usual, 
294 considers some environmental policies and decisions are implemented in Brazil, competing with 
295 economic growth. The S3, conservative, assumes that in Brazil there are large-scale and active 







































































296 restoration of native vegetation and significant improvements in environmental policies (Fendrich et 
297 al 2020).
298 Here we used the S2 - business as usual scenario, to generate a map of the variation of native 
299 vegetation probability (VNVP map) between 2017 and 2025, where positive values represent pixels 
300 with an increase in the probability of native vegetation existence until 2025. In contrast, negative 
301 values represent pixels with a decrease in the probability of native vegetation existence until 2025. 
302 Further, we have combined the rural properties with unprotected native vegetation and the VNVP 
303 map to extract the average probability for each of these properties. These probability values are 
304 relative and averaged over all pixels per property. Therefore, this value presents the average 
305 probability of natural vegetation occurring on properties with Legal Reserve surpluses being lost. For 
306 example, if the Legal Reserve surplus of a property is composed equally by pixels with VNVP of 2% 
307 and 5%, then its average VNVP is 3.5%, therefore it has not risk of being lost until 2025. If the value 
308 is negative, then there is risk of legal deforestation. Fig. S1 expresses the distribution of the average 
309 probabilities within rural properties.
310 The distribution of the VNVP shows that 99.6% of the properties with unprotected native 
311 vegetation have VNVP between -5% and +5%, with the majority of the properties (79,2 % of the 
312 total) presenting negative values (Fig. 2). Based on the distribution of the VNVP, we defined four 
313 classes of risk of the deforestation of unprotected native vegetation:
314  Properties with VNVP lower than -3% = High risk
315  Properties with VNVP between -3% and -1%= Medium risk
316  Properties with VNVP between -1% and 0% = Low risk
317  Properties with VNVP higher or equal than 0% = No risk
318








































































319 Fig. 2 - Distribution of the average variation of native vegetation probability (VNVP) between 2017 and 2025 within 
320 rural properties with unprotected native vegetation. Positive values represent pixels with increase in the probability of 
321 native vegetation existence until 2025 whereas negative values represent pixels with decrease in the probability of native 
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